Lucy Chapman, instructed by Laura Calvert of the Royal College of Nursing, acted for the Respondent Mr Masih in Nursing & Midwifery Council v Masih [2026] EWHC 2094 (Admin), successfully opposing the extension of an interim order applied for by the regulator.
Mr Masih had been subject to an interim order for more than three and a half years, relating to lack of competence and misconduct allegations between seven and four years previously.
The Court was highly critical of all aspects of the regulatory process against the Respondent, summarising:
99. If the attention and resources which have been devoted to it are anything to go by, the NMC does not seem to think this is a very important case. Every level of the proceedings has been characterised by unjustified delay and confusing and inadequate evidence. This is true of the investigations, the panel hearings, and the application to me.
Further, the last reviewing panel had failed to give adequate reasons for continuing the order, the Applicant’s application was selective, incomplete, and in some respects misleading, failing to demonstrate why a continuation of the order was necessary and outweighed the prejudice to the Respondent. Registrants are entitled to a fair process, and the delay was not justified. Interim orders are “a holding operation”, made prior to any substantive findings, and ought not to last beyond a year or two:
102. If it appears from the evidence that the regulator will not reach a point when, by a substantive decision, it can ascertain whether an interim order is really necessary for the protection of the public until a date which is unnecessarily and excessively distant from its inception, the burden of an interim order may not be justified. Those who have had the benefit of interim orders are under a duty to keep the time when they are in force to a minimum. Interim orders are not a substitute for final orders. They are a holding operation. Applications to the High Court are not a matter of routine. They invite the court to exercise an original jurisdiction….
105. A year or two should be regarded as a long time for the whole currency of an interim order, and not as a starting point to be routinely prolonged by multiple extensions. If progress is made within the primary timescales envisaged by Article 31, it will not be necessary to apply to the High Court at all. Multiple applications to the High Court indicate that something has gone wrong with the timetable, and require explanation and justification. A level of risk which tips the balance on a first application, will weigh less heavily when matters are over time added to the opposite side of the balance, such as culpable delay, prejudicial impact, or remediation. Each application for a High Court extension will be more difficult than the last.
106. The need for protection of the public and the public interest are very important, when properly evidenced and presented. But the registrant is entitled to a fair process, and to have interim restrictions last no more than a reasonable time, given that they are imposed when no substantive findings have been made.
Although a failure to adhere to the mandatory review provisions under Article 31 of the Nursing and Midwifery Order 2001 would not result in an order automatically falling away, such failures were a relevant consideration when assessing prejudice to a respondent.
The case serves as a reminder that repeated applications for extension to the High Court should not be routine, nor a “rubber stamping” exercise. Even where a registrant is facing misconduct or lack of competent charges where actual or potential harm to patients is alleged, it does not follow that in all cases the bar of necessity will be met. Regulators must always be candid and fair in their applications highlighting factors for and against the extension, whether or not the respondent is represented.
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